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WHO INVESTS TOO MUCH IN EMPLOYER STOCK, AND WHY DO THEY DO 
IT?  SOME EVIDENCE FROM UK STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using data from a survey of employee stock-owners in seven UK companies, the 
author examines the determinants of excessive ownership of company stock in 
savings portfolios.  The paper draws on the insights from the recent 401 (k) literature 
and examines the role of attitudes as well as demographic characteristics.  By using a 
survey of employees it is possible to investigate the role of these factors more 
precisely than in much of the 401 (k) literature.  The results indicate that loyalty and 
familiarity are important determinants of concentration in employer stock.  Income is 
important too: the results imply that as savings rise with income, familiarity especially 
leads employees to channel much of this into employer stock.    
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Why do some employees invest heavily in employer stock when prudent investment 
principles suggest that they should not?  This has become a major issue in the context 
of US 401 (k) pension plans, and has been given sharp relief by the events at Enron 
and other corporate scandals.  In the last ten years a fairly substantial literature has 
developed in behavioral finance examining the factors that lead employees to invest, 
and invest substantially, in employer stock when presented with a choice of 
investment alternatives in their pension plan.  This literature has highlighted the role 
of plan design and irrational behavior of participating employees.  By contrast, the 
industrial relations literature on employee stock ownership plans has barely 
considered the issue of portfolio concentration despite the obvious dangers that 
company stock plans will encourage employees to make poor investment choices.  
This literature has tended to assume that stock ownership plans are a good thing if 
there are favorable impacts on corporate performance, and this judgment has been 
made without reference to the potential costs borne by employees.   
 
This paper extends the analysis of portfolio concentration found in 401 (k) plans to 
employee stock ownership plans, drawing on data from a stock acquisition plan in the 
UK.  The reasoning is that in countries outside the US, where defined contribution 
pension plans are much less widespread, employee stock ownership plans tend to be 
the main means by which employees acquire company stock.  Although stock 
ownership plans tend not to contribute to future pension income in the way that 401 
(k) plans do, they can nevertheless be a very important investment.  On average, 
employees contribute between 5 and 7 per cent of their annual income to the stock 
plan in our study, with higher proportions in evidence amongst lower income 
employees.  These levels are similar to the proportion of salaries that are typically 
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paid into company pension plans in the UK.  In the case of stock ownership plans, the 
issue of inadequate diversification relates to the role of company stock in employees’ 
overall savings and investment portfolios.   
 
The paper addresses a number of questions.  Who tends to overweight in employer 
stock?   Do certain types or groups of employees concentrate their investments more 
than others?   What are the determinants of portfolio concentration?  The paper takes 
a novel approach in that it examines the determinants of over-weighting by collecting 
information directly from employees rather than from company filings or plan 
administrators.  It can therefore examine directly the role of employee attitudes and 
preferences, instead of basing attitudinal and behavioral explanations on macro-
patterns in plan assets (as is the case in much of the 401 (k) literature).  We assess the 
role of loyalty and familiarity, both of which are important explanatory factors in the 
literature (Benartzi 2001; Cohen 2004; Huberman 2001).   Although data is obtained 
from the rather different regulatory and savings context of the UK, the results are 
broadly consistent with those in the US pensions literature.  We also present 
disturbing evidence at the end of the paper that overweight employees are continuing 
to pour income into the stock plan, that many of the most overweight employees have 
no other equity-based investments, and that overweight employees are no more likely 
to monitor their company-based investments than other employees.   
 
1. Portfolio choice 
 
Employee stock ownership plans, supported by tax concessions, are obviously 
designed to encourage employees to acquire company stock.  Where stock is granted 
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free to employees, and in addition to wages, this does not seem to pose major 
problems.  But where employees are invited to subscribe to company stock, there is 
the possibility that employees will invest too much, thereby exposing themselves to 
unnecessary risk.  To date, we lack information on this issue but there is a clear 
message from the 401 (k) literature: given the opportunity, many employees will 
invest far too much in company stock.  Mitchell and Utkus have estimated that nearly 
a quarter of 401(k) participants with the opportunity to invest in company stock have 
in excess of 60 per cent of their plan assets in employer stock (2003).  Other studies 
have found similar results: Liang and Weisbenner (2002) find that the average share 
of company stock in participants’ discretionary contributions is nearly 20 per cent, 
whilst Benartzi and Thaler (2001) found that over 40 per cent of the assets of 67 funds 
are invested in company stock.  The potential consequences of over-concentration in 
employer stock have been graphically illustrated by recent corporate scandals and 
collapses.  Over half (62 per cent) of the assets in the Enron 401 (k) plan were 
invested in Enron stock.  Even without the risks of collapse, portfolio concentration is 
a costly investment strategy since most employees will secure better returns by 
investing in a diversified portfolio (Meulbrock 2005).   
 
Given these costs and risks, the reasons for over-concentration in employer stock are 
clearly of interest.  The literature on 401 (k) plans has identified two sets of inter-
related factors: plan design and irrational employee behavior.   Plan design issues 
include the inclusion of company stock in the range of asset classes, and the common 
practice, particularly in larger firms, of employers matching employee contributions 
with company stock.  Both may be interpreted as ‘implicit investment advice’ (Liang 
and Weisbenner 2002).   Huberman and Sengmueller find that participants amplify 
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matching contributions made in company stock with higher voluntary company stock 
contributions (2004: 433).  The number of asset classes on offer may also affect the 
extent of employee concentration especially as employees often make ‘naïve 
allocation choices’, such as dividing their contributions equally between asset types 
(Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Liang and Weisbenner 2002), possibly as a way of 
simplifying the decision set (Madrian and Shea 2001).   
 
Employee attitudes and behavior are clearly central to portfolio concentration, 
whatever the contours set by plan design, and the literature has identified several 
salient characteristics and processes.  A widespread explanation focuses on 
procrastination and inertia (Madrian and Shea 2001; Agnew et al 2001).  Employees 
put off making investment decisions, possibly because they are too difficult or boring.  
Where plan design features encourage acquisition of employer stock, inertia and 
procrastination will mean that employees fail to sufficiently re-balance their 
investment portfolios.  The evidence on trading behavior is certainly supportive of 
this: most employees do not actively trade any component of their 401 (k) portfolios 
(Mitchell et al 2005; Agnew et al 2001), and employees tend not to take the 
opportunities provided by plan rules to diversify at certain age and tenure thresholds 
(Choi et al 2005)i.     
 
Another explanation focuses on the tendency of employees to base investment 
decisions on past returns rather then likely future returns (Huberman and Sengmueller 
2004; Benartzi 2001; Sengmueller 2001).  Huberman and Sengmueller find that good 
current stock performance is associated with increased flows into company stock 
whilst bad performance does not lead to transfers out.  The lack of association 
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between investment choices and future returns also indicates that insider information 
does not influence stock purchases (Benartzi 2001; Huberman and Sengmueller 2004; 
Cohen 2004).   
 
A further explanation highlights the role of ‘familiarity’: it is argued that employees 
like to invest in the familiar, reflecting a broader and more fundamental human 
tendency to go with what we know best (Huberman 2001).  There is some limited 
empirical support for this: the presence of a company stock in a 401 (k) plan increases 
participation rates, especially amongst low-income employees (Huberman 2003).  
However, it is difficult to test familiarity, especially with the data sources that are 
commonly used (company level data and plan administrator records).  Survey 
methods seem more appropriate but even then there are design issues.  Benartzi asked 
employees to assess their degree of familiarity with their company.  Although the 
results are not presented in detail in the paper, such an approach seems likely to 
generated skewed responses.  However, he found that familiarity so measured was not 
a significant predictor of portfolio concentration (2001: 1095).   
 
Loyalty might also explain investment in employer stock.  Those with greater 
organizational commitment may be more likely to invest, and to invest more (Mitchell 
and Utkus 2003; Cohen 2004).  There are two aspects here: more committed 
employees may get utility from expressing their commitment in stock purchases, and 
may perceive the value of employer stock and company prospects more favorably 
than others (Cohen 2004).  Yet the evidence for a commitment effect is not strong.  
Although Cohen finds a commitment effect, this is observed indirectly by comparing 
portfolio behavior of employees in single division firms with those in comglomerates.  
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The key assumption is that employees in single division firms with be more 
committed to the firm.  He also uses union membership as a proxy for low 
commitment.  Those familiar with the dual commitment literature might find this a 
somewhat questionable approach (Angle and Perry 1986).  Benartzi, by contrast, 
measures commitment directly, using the Mowday et al Organisational Commitment 
Scale in an employee survey, but fails to find a commitment effect (2001).  This 
might be because the sample is mainly composed of middle-aged, high income white 
males: it is possible that there is less variance in the commitment scores than would 
be found in a more diverse sample.           
 
Overall, the recent literature on 401 (k) plans has generated fascinating insights into 
how and why employees acquire too much employer stock.  Its main limitation, 
however, is the limited direct information on those doing the behaving!  Many studies 
of portfolio allocations and concentration in employee stock use company 11-K 
reports filed to the SEC (eg Huberman and Sengmueller 2004: Liang and Weisbenner 
2002) or Form 5500 filed with the IRS and Department of Labor (eg Meulbroek 
2005).  Whilst these data are useful for comparing plan design and practices between 
companiesii, they do not contain information on individual choices (or their 
determinants).  The behavioral explanations identified in this literature are therefore 
often imputed from firm-level phenomena.  Other studies of 401 (k) plans use 
administrative records maintained by plan providers though these have been seldom 
used for investigating portfolio concentration (an exception is Choi et al 2004).  These 
records have been useful for exploring the role of demographic factors in participation 
in 401 (k) plans but they are limited by the absence of those attitudinal and behavioral 
 9
characteristics (other than the revealed preference of investment choice) which are 
thought to influence investment practices.   
 
There is an argument, then, for alternative sources of data.  We use an employee 
survey to collect information on demographic and attitudinal characteristics.   Use of a 
survey also counteracts another important limitation of administrative and disclosure 
data: insufficient information on employees’ total investment portfolios (Poterba 
2003; Mitchell and Utkus 2003).  Studies of 401 (k) plans based on regulatory filings 
or administrators’ records can typically only assess holdings of employer stock 
against other investments within the plan, whereas an employee survey can assess 
portfolio concentration within total savings. 
 
 
2.   Predictions 
 
The key objective of the research is to evaluate the demographic and attitudinal 
determinants of portfolio concentration amongst employees in employer stock 
ownership plans.  The rationale for focusing on company stock plans is that these are 
the main means by which employees acquire stock in their employer in countries 
outside the US.  As noted earlier, it is possible for employees to put substantial 
portions of their income into stock plans with the clear dangers that this poses in 
terms of risk exposure.   The rest of this section generates a set of predictions, based 
on the 401 (k) and equity investment literatures, and gives further information about 
the proxies and variables used in the analysis. 
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 Demographic factors  
 
Age.  The likelihood of owning stock (Amerik and Zeldes 2001), and participating in 
employer stock plans, rise with age (Pendleton 2006) (though declining somewhat in 
the run-up to retirement).  However, portfolio concentration might be expected to 
decline by age somewhat on the grounds that knowledge of personal finance will 
improve with age.  Also, there is some evidence that stock trading is more prevalent 
amongst older employees (Mitchell et al 2005) and thus older workers with 
concentrations of employer stock may trade out of them to some extent.  However, 
there is also evidence that divestment of company stock does not vary by age (Choi et 
al 2005) and that portfolio concentration within 401 (k) plans rises with age, though 
not strongly so (Holden and VanDerhei 2001)iii.   Given this evidence, we predict that 
portfolio concentration will rise with age.  In the survey age is recorded using a five-
category ordinal question, and converted into four dummies for the statistical analysis.     
       
Income.  On the basis that income will proxy for education and ability, portfolio 
concentration should be inversely related to income.  As above, the greater propensity 
to trade amongst high earners observed in some studies might mitigate somewhat the 
observed influence of income on propensity to save, to purchase equities (Agnew et al 
2001), and to invest in employer stock (Pendleton 2006).  However, other studies (eg 
Choi et al 2005) find that divestment of company stock is not influenced by income 
levels (2005), and this might lead to concentration over time.  On this basis, we 
predict that concentration will rise with income.    The survey records income with an 
eight- category question: these categories are collapsed into four in the analysis (three 
dummies).   
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 Sex.  Much of the evidence to date indicates that females are less likely to invest in 
equities (Agnew et al 2003) though more likely to participate in savings plans and 
accumulate savings (Huberman et al 2003)iv.  Gender differences in investment 
behavior are typically attributed to variations in risk-aversion (Agnew et al 2003) or 
‘over-confidence’ amongst men (Barber and Odean 2001).  It is predicted therefore 
that women will be less likely to concentrate their savings and investments in 
employer stock.    
 
Attitudinal predictions 
 
Organisational commitment.  Those who are more committed to the company may 
have a greater propensity to hold higher concentrations of employer stock as an 
expression of their loyalty and as an outcome of over-favourable perceptions of 
company prospects (Cohen 2004).  To assess this, employees were asked five of the 
positively-worded five-point items from the British Organizational Commitment scale 
(Cook and Wall 1980).  These were combined into a single commitment scale (Alpha 
= 0.8063). 
Risk aversion.  Risk preferences are seen as a key determinant in much of the 
literature but, with a few exceptions (eg Sunden and Surette 1998), are rarely 
measured directly.  Instead risk aversion is viewed as a revealed preference.  Here we 
have a direct five-point measure of risk preference (‘share ownership is only 
worthwhile if there is no risk involved’).  We predict that those with lower risk 
aversion will more likely hold a concentrated position in employer stock.  
Familiarity  Following Huberman, concentrated ownership of employee stock is 
predicted to follow from familiarity: employees prefer to invest in the familiar.  
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Familiarity is difficult to operationalize empirically since all employees will 
necessarily be familiar with their employer and the stock plan (all participate in it), 
though possibly to varying degrees.   To capture variations in familiarity we measure 
the duration of employee participation in the company’s stock ownership plans, on the 
basis that longer participation will reflect greater familiarity.  A potential problem 
with this measure is that the longer the duration of participation, the greater the 
opportunity to build up holdings in employer stock, all other things being equal.  
Thus, the measure might pick-up inertia as well as familiarity (i.e. a failure to trade-
out of employer stock).   However, since participation in savings contracts to purchase 
employer stock and conversion of these contracts into stock both require positive and 
explicit formal decisions by employees, the noise in this measure is felt not to be too 
serious.  We use tenure as a measure of familiarity with the employer.  A problem 
with both proxies, though, is that they will inevitably be highly inter-correlated with 
age, given career employment in all organizations in the study (mean tenure = 12.4 
years; S.D = 8.6).  Thus, the regression results may be unstable on insertion of 
familiarity proxies.  A further conceptual and measurement issue concerns the nature 
of familiarity: our measures assume it is a broadly linear phenomenon but it is 
possible there is a threshold effect after which familiarity grows far more slowly than 
in an initial period of getting to know the company and/or the stock planv. 
         
   
3. Data 
 
Data were collected from employees in seven large UK companies with Save As You 
Earn (SAYE) plans in late 1999.  The objective of the survey was to collect data on all 
aspects of employee participation in stock plans, especially SAYE.  It was organized 
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by the financial education lobbying body Proshare, and administered in conjunction 
with two share plan administrators: Abbey National and Halifax Employee Share 
Services.  Questionnaires were sent randomly to 24, 196 employees in these 
companies (combined UK employment of 262,320), with 5223 submitting completed 
and useable returns (response rate = 21.58%).   After removing those who have not 
participated in the plan and/or do not hold any employer stock there are 4073 
respondents used in the study.                
 
SAYE is a combined savings and stock option plan, which provides a low-risk 
method for employees to acquire stock in their employer.  It is a well-established and 
popular set of arrangements: in 2004 700 companies had a live SAYE plan, with 
options subscribed to by 600,000 employees (Inland Revenue 2005).  At the outset 
participants decide a level of option awards for three or five years hence.   They take 
out a SAYE tax-advantageous savings plan, with regular monthly payments.  At the 
end of the savings period they can either take the lump sum or exercise their SAYE 
options.  In the sample 85% acquired shares at the end of the savings period in their 
most recent SAYE maturity, with just over half of these retaining the shares for a year 
or more.  Those acquiring shares are liable to capital gains tax when shares are sold, 
though an annual CGT allowance means that no tax will be paid in most 
circumstancesvi.    Employers can offer up to a 20 per cent discount on the prevailing 
market price at award, and most do (all companies in the study did so).  Although 
SAYE uses an option form it differs from the standard American model whereby 
stock option grants are awarded by the company as an integral part of remuneration.   
The SAYE plan can be seen as a discretionary deferred stock purchase plan without 
downside risk during the ‘holding’ (vesting) period.  The features of SAYE plans are 
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narrowly prescribed by legislation so there is very little difference between plans in 
the seven companies.  Whilst this entails that we cannot test the influence of plan 
design, it means that the influence of plan design is controlled for in the research 
design.           
 
The main dependent variable is the proportion of employee savings and investments 
that is accounted for by employer stockvii.  This is a subjective measure of portfolio 
concentration, and invites employees to choose four categories of concentration:  1-
25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, and 76-100%.   The dependent variable is essentially 
subjective (compared with the detailed financial information found in the behavioral 
finance literature) but respondents’ evaluation of value is important given the focus on 
employee perceptions and attitudes.   Use of categories is not ideal but more precise 
questioning on this topic can depress response rates and invite inaccurate responses.  
Benartzi et al (forthcoming) attempted to gain more precise information on 
concentration but had to use categories as a fall-back position for around a quarter of 
respondents.  A further point to note is that this measure excludes pensions 
investments and housing: in the UK the predominance of a defined benefit 
occupational pension system amongst large employers (until very recently) means that 
most employees draw a sharp distinction between savings and pensions.   Neither 
pension contributions nor pension benefits would be included in individuals’ 
calculations of their savings and investments (except perhaps amongst company 
directors).   All firms in the study had a defined benefit pensions plan at the time.   
The strength of the concentration measure used here is that it factors in all other 
employee savings and investments unlike many of the 401 (k) studies, where the 
focus is assets held just within the plan. 
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 The analytical approach in the remainder of the paper is to identify determinants of 
portfolio concentration.  Prior to presenting regression results, we present descriptive 
statistics to give a picture of the characteristics of those tending to concentrate in 
employer stock.  Following the regression results we present further results which 
highlight the significance of the problem of excessive concentration. 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 1 presents information on the proportion of employee shareholders in each 
portfolio category.  22 per cent of shareholders have 50% or more of their savings and 
investments held in portfolio stock.  This is similar to levels of concentration found 
within 401 (k) accounts mentioned earlier.  It is noticeable that the differences 
between men and women are negligible, contrary to predictions. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
Table 2 presents information on the proportion of each age group in each portfolio 
category.  As with sex, the differences between age groups are tiny.  Once again this 
is contrary to the prediction that concentration will rise with age, though consistent 
with recent findings in Choi et al (2005). 
 
Table 2 about here   
 
Table 3 shows the proportion of each income group in each portfolio category.   Here 
the results are more striking: the likelihood of higher concentration rises with income.   
 16
It was expected that those on higher incomes would more likely diversity assuming 
high levels of education and financial literacy amongst higher earnings.  Instead, these 
results imply that the higher levels of savings associated with higher income (the 
strongest determinant of contributions to SAYE plans is income, as is true of 401 (k) 
plans) tend to flow disproportionately into employer stock.      
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In the next stage of the analysis, the results of multiple regression are presented.  The 
determinants of portfolio concentration are evaluated using OLS procedures.  The 
four-category dependent variable is converted to a continuous variable by taking the 
mid-point of each category.   As Stewart points out (1983), this is a somewhat ad hoc 
procedure, with the unknown distribution of values within each category being the 
main limitation.  An alternative approach is the interval regression procedure in 
STATA whereby lower bound and upper bound values are created.  However, the 
nature of the categories is such that the lower and upper bound values correlate 
perfectly so little is to be gained by this procedure.  Coefficients and standard errors 
are very similar though not quite identical to those from OLS, whilst OLS has the 
advantage of a more precise model fit.    OLS is also preferred to an ordered category 
(e.g. probit) approach as the coefficients are more meaningful, though once again the 
results are similar (model fit, relative size of coefficients, and significance levels).  
The approach in the regressions is to test each variable of interest, starting with the 
demographic variables.   
 
Table 4 about here
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Taking the basic demographic model first, the results indicate that the impact of 
income on portfolio concentration is strongly positive, whilst age and gender have 
small and insignificant effects (except for Age55+).  This is unsurprising given the 
earlier descriptive statistics.   Income is a powerful predictor of the level of savings in 
employer stock plans: the correlation between the ‘raw’ income variable and the level 
of current contributions into SAYE is high (r = 0.501***).  Thus, as employee 
contributions to savings grow with income, the implication is that a disproportionate 
amount goes into employer stock.     
 
The first familiarity model adds tenure to the demographic model.  The measure of 
tenure is positive and significant at 0.001, providing support for a familiarity 
explanation.  On the assumption that tenure proxies familiarity with the employer, the 
better employees know their employer the more they come to hold concentrations of 
employer stock.  In this model the age dummies become steadily more significant and 
negative: this is unsurprising given the correlation between age and tenure (r = 
0.473***).   The second model replaces tenure with the duration of participation in 
SAYE, and proxies familiarity with the stock plan.  This variable is a very powerful 
determinant of concentration in employer stock, and the model fit improves 
substantially.   Inclusion of this measure attenuates the effect of income somewhat but 
income remains a significant determinant of concentration. 
 
In the commitment model, commitment is a significant determinant of concentration 
though the magnitude of effects are between half and a quarter of the familiarity 
proxies.  The behavior of other variables is consistent with previous models.   Then, in 
the risk preference model, this proxy is significantly related to concentration.  Finally, 
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all of the models are combined.  In this the duration of participation in the employer 
stock plan and commitment are the strongest non-demographic influences on portfolio 
concentration, with risk preferences and tenure becoming insignificant.  It is 
noticeable that the income effects are considerably smaller in this model, implying 
that higher income employees tend to have some combination of familiarity with the 
stock plan and commitment to the firm.     
 
5. Further analysis 
 
The results from the regressions are suggestive of the idea that those with excessive 
employer stock tend to be those who have participated in employer stock plans for 
some time and tend to put disproportionate proportions of additional savings into 
employer stock as their income increases.   The results indicate that familiarity and 
loyalty influence portfolio concentration.  In this final section we examine the nature 
of portfolio concentration further and assess whether those employees with 
concentrated positions in employer stock take any steps to mitigate the risks arising 
from this.   
 
The first column of Table 5 reports the average level of current contributions into the 
SAYE plan for each portfolio grouping.  As can be seen, there is quite a pronounced 
jump from contribution levels in the group with least concentration to those of the 
next group.  The most concentrated group has the highest levels of current 
contributions.  Although it is possible that participants may not exercise the options or 
may sell stock at or near option exercise, and therefore not add to portfolio 
concentration, earlier behavior and evidence elsewhere (see Pendleton 2005) suggests 
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that most will exercise and retain stock.  Thus, there is circumstantial evidence that 
employees are adding to their portfolio problem. 
 
Table 5 about here      
 
Column 2 of Table 5 presents results on the extent to which employees hold 
additional equity-based investments.  In the survey employees were asked if they held 
stock in other companies or in mutual funds.  A number of routes were identified for 
acquiring other stock (stock purchases, stock purchases in privatization initiatives 
etc).  An index was created (0-5) for the number of these alternative stock-based 
investments.  As can be seen in Table 5, the most concentrated group is notable for 
the lowest average number of alternative investments.  This implies not merely that a 
disproportionate amount of investment is held in employer stock but that for many 
employees their holdings of employer stock are their only stock-based investments.  
50 per cent of the most concentrated group has no other stock-based investments, and 
a further 31 per cent have just one.  The most common form of stock is that awarded 
to building society customers when building societies converted from mutual 
ownership to public limited company status.  Overall, portfolio concentration is 
clearly not about incorrect balancing of a diversified portfolio but the absence of any 
diversification at all in many cases and very limited and inactive balancing in 
othersviii.  
 
Finally, we examine the extent to which employees with concentrated portfolios 
monitor their investments in company stock.  The expectation is that employees with 
more concentrated portfolios will monitor company performance to a greater extent 
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than others because of their exposure to risk.  Table 6 presents descriptive results for 
two questions in the survey relating to monitoring. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
It is noticeable that the distribution of answers between the portfolio categories to the 
question on stock price monitoring is very similar.  This finding is reinforced by the 
results for engagement with company information: those with concentrated portfolios 
are not more likely than other groups to read information about the company.  
Overall, these results add to anxieties about the dangers of excessive ownership of 
company stock: those with concentrated positions do not appear to be more concerned 
about their investment than other employees. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main conclusion of the study is that employee behavior in employee stock 
ownership plans is similar to that observed in 401 (k) pension plans.  There is a 
sizeable proportion of employee stock-holders who appear to hold too much company 
stock.  Some of the behavioral influences identified in the pensions literature – loyalty 
and familiarity – do influence levels of portfolio concentration.  The results suggest 
that, in the presence of employee stock ownership plans, increased savings arising 
from income increases tend to flow disproportionately into stock ownership for those 
employees with greatest loyalty and familiarity.  As well as extending the analysis of 
pension plans to stock ownership plans, the paper makes a contribution by using a 
large-scale employee survey (the largest in the area as far as is known by the author) 
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so that employee-level phenomenon can be discerned more clearly than where 
company-level and plan administrator records are the data source. 
 
The results in the paper clearly add to our anxieties about poor risk management 
amongst employees.  This poses a number of challenges: whilst allocation between 
asset classes could be controlled by regulation in 401 (k) plans, as is suggested by 
Poterba (2003) and Benartzi et al (forthcoming), it is less clear how this might be 
done in stand-alone stock ownership plans.  One possibility might be to limit the 
amount that employees can subscribe to stock plans but there is the danger that this 
might depress the overall level of employee savings.  Certainly there is no evidence in 
this study that employees will readily invest in alternative stocks (contrary to one of 
the policy justifications for employer stock plans).  Another possibility is greater 
financial education.  However, the evidence suggests that ‘passive’ financial 
education is insufficient to change behavior in this area (Choi et al 2005).  More 
active financial advice would seem to be needed, though without contravening 
regulations on financial services.  This might be a role for trade unions.      
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Table 1 The distribution of portfolio concentration 
  % in each portfolio category  
 All Female Male 
1-25% 58 60 57 
26-50% 19 18 20 
51-75% 11 11 12 
76-100% 11 11 11 
N 4073 2072 1948 
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Table  2 Breakdown of portfolio concentration by age of employee 
  % of each age group in each portfolio concentration category 
 
 16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
1-25% 58 60 58 59 57 
26-50% 19 19 19 18 19 
51-75% 11 11 11 12 12 
76-100% 11 11 12 12 12 
N 262 1034 1357 1105 331 
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Table 3 Breakdown of portfolio concentration by income of employee 
% of each income group (£’000) in each portfolio concentration 
category 
 
 1 - 9.9k 10 - 19.9k 20 - 29.9k 30k+ 
1-25% 68 61 55 50 
26-50% 16 18 20 23 
51-75% 8 11 12 14 
76-100% 9 10 13 13 
N 743 1332 1158 788 
 
 28
Table 4 Determinants of portfolio concentration 
  OLS: betas and t-ratios  
 
Variables Demographic 
model 
  
 
Familiarity 
model 1 
 
 
Familiarity 
model 2 
Commitment 
model 
Risk 
preferences 
model 
Combined 
model  
Age 26-34 0.020 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.057 
(-1.77) 
0.015 
(0.46) 
0.016 
(0.48) 
-0.071 
(-2.14*) 
Age 35-44 -0.025 
(-0.72) 
-.0.074 
(-2.11*) 
-0.136 
(-3.90*** 
-0.027 
(-0.76) 
-0.028 
(-0.80) 
-0.152 
(-4.28***) 
Age 45-54 -0.029 
(-0.87) 
-0.110 
(-3.14**) 
-0.165 
(-4.84***) 
-0.041 
(-1.22) 
-0.039 
(-1.16) 
-0.197 
(-5.59***) 
Age 55+ -0.052 
(-2.16*) 
-0.107 
(-4.27***) 
-0.140 
(-5.78***) 
-0.061 
(-2.51*) 
-0.059 
(-2.43*) 
-0.163 
(-6.53***) 
Salary 10-
19.9k 
0.071 
(3.13**) 
0.054 
(2.35*) 
0.027 
(1.21) 
0.071 
(3.04**) 
0.069 
(2.99**) 
0.023 
(1.01) 
Salary 20-
29.9k 
0.135 
(5.45***) 
0.104 
(4.17***) 
0.074 
(3.03**) 
0.128 
(5.08***) 
0.126 
(5.02***) 
0.056 
(2.23*) 
Salary 30k+ 0.156 
(6.52***) 
0.124 
(5.10***) 
0.085 
(3.55***) 
0.138 
(5.58***) 
0.144 
(5.82***) 
0.053 
(2.14*) 
Sex 0.013 
(0.61) 
0.006 
(0.32) 
0.019 
(0.92) 
0.016 
(0.78) 
0.012 
(0.56) 
0.018 
(0.85) 
Familiarity: 
tenure 
 0.146 
(7.42***) 
   0.036 
(1.69 
Familiarity: 
duration of 
participation 
in the stock 
plan 
  0.291 
(15.32***) 
  0.279 
(13.12***) 
Commitment - -  0.078 
(4.80***) 
- 0.082 
(5.06***) 
Risk 
preference 
- -  
 
- 0.054 
(3.32***) 
0.029 
(1.80) 
Company 
dummies 
Yes Yes /yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4020 4020 3997 3914 3936 3863 
F 12.32*** 15.32*** 27.67*** 12.80*** 12.27*** 24.66*** 
Ajdusted R2 0.038 0.051 0.091 0.043 0.041 0.099 
 
Notes: * = significant at 0.05; ** = significant at 0.01: *** = significant at 0.001 
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Table 5 Information on employee investments 
 
Portfolio 
concentration 
Current 
level of 
savings in 
SAYE  
Mean (SD) 
Index of 
alternative 
equity  
investments 
Mean 
1-25% 1074 (873) 1.22 
26-50% 1627 (960) 1.35 
51-75% 1629 (909) 1.19 
76-100% 1672 (946) 0.78 
F value 122.9*** 24.15*** 
 
Notes: significant at 0.001 
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Table 6 Extent of company monitoring by employee stock-holders 
 How often do you check the 
company’s stock price 
Too what extent do you read 
information about the company 
supplied by the company 
Portfolio 
concentration 
category 
Everyday At 
least 
once 
a 
week 
Less 
than 
once 
a 
week 
Never Always Most 
of the 
time 
Some 
of the 
time 
Never 
1-25% 30 31 37 2 43 32 20 5 
26-50% 31 36 32 2 44 33 19 4 
51-75% 31 35 32 2 47 30 18 5 
76-100% 29 35 32 3 44 30 23 4 
X2 
 
27.817* 
 
   9.527    
 
Notes: * = significant at .05 
 
                                                 
i There is some limited evidence of re-balancing both in the 401 (k) (Huberman and Sengmueller 2004) 
and executive compensation literatures (Ofek and Yermack 2000). 
ii 11 K forms distinguish between employer and employee contributions, and also indicate whether 
company contributions are made in company stock 
iii Papke (1998) finds that age is negatively, though not significantly, associated with ownership of 
stocks in retirement portfolios 
iv Papke (1998) and Sunden and Surette (1998) show that marital status complicates the influence of 
gender. 
v We conduct an ad hoc test for this (not reported) by creating a dummy variable where 1 equals 
employment of three years of more.  The results are broadly similar to those reported in the regressions 
though the coefficients are smaller.  In conjunction with the regression results presented, this suggests 
that there is some kind of threshold affect with familiarity continuing to grow but at a slower rate once 
the threshold is passed.  
vi Taper relief has been introduced since the study was conducted with the CGT liability expiring if 
shares are held for 4 years or more. 
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vii Each company operated a defined benefit company pension scheme open to all employees at the time 
of the survey.  At this time employees were not provided with an annual statement of pension benefits 
nor of total contributions into the plan so they would not have had a meaningful measure of their 
pension investment.  Employees contributing to company defined benefit plans tend not to include 
pension contributions or benefits in self-assessments of savings ratios. 
viii Inclusion of these two measures in the prediction regressions improves model fit considerably (from 
around 10 % to 15%).  However, they are not inserted because of their apparent endogeneity and their 
lack of direct theoretical contribution to the models, though acquisition of other company’s stock could 
be an indirect measure of familiarity.  
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